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What happened in the sixties?
JON AGAR*
Abstract. In general history and popular culture, the long 1960s, a period roughly beginning
in the mid-1950s and ending in the mid-1970s, has been held to be a period of change. This
paper oﬀers a model which captures something of the long 1960s as a period of ‘sea change’
resulting from the interference of three waves. Wave One was an institutional dynamic that
drew out experts from closed and hidden disagreement into situations where expert dis-
agreement was open to public scrutiny. Wave One also accounts for the multiplication of
experts. Wave Two consisted of social movements, institutions and audiences that could carry
public scrutiny and provide a home for sea-change cultures. In particular, Wave Two provided
the stage, audience and agents to orchestrate a play of disagreeing experts. Wave Three was
marked by an orientation towards the self, in diverse ways. Modern science studies is a
phenomenon of Wave Three. All three waves must be understood in the context of the un-
folding Cold War.
If we collect together and review the secondary literature on science and technology in
the 1960s, alongside general histories of the period, what patterns can be found? Can a
synthesis be made? What is clariﬁed? What is obscured? What is left out? In the sci-
ence-studies literature we lack suﬃciently synthetic accounts,1 while the general his-
tories have barely begun to address science and technology, beyond a handful of
familiar topics: the pill, elite critical thought, television, the Apollo programme.2
This essay asks whether the ‘ long 1960s’ is a helpful category for historians of
science and technology. It sets out a ‘three-wave’ model that, I propose, captures much
of the best analysis from scholarship that has otherwise not been connected. Wave One
is an institutional dynamic drawn from institutional history. Wave Two centres on
* Department of Science and Technology Studies (STS), University College London, Gower Street,
London, WC1E 6BT, UK. Email: ucrhjea@ucl.ac.uk.
Thanks to John Krige, Ste`ve Bernardin, Matt Wisnioski, Peder Ankar, David Hollinger, Jerry Ravetz, Peter
Galison, Charles Rosenberg, Kathryn Packer and Simon Schaﬀer; to colleagues in Manchester, Cambridge,
Harvard and University College London; and to the anonymous reviewers.
1 The best surveys are E. Mendelsohn, ‘The politics of pessimism: science and technology circa 1968’, in
Technology, Pessimism and Postmodernism (ed. Y. Ezrahi, E. Mendelsohn and H. Segal), Amherst, 1994,
151–73; J. R. Ravetz, ‘Orthodoxies, critiques and alternatives ’, in The Companion to the History of Modern
Science (ed. R. Olby et al.), London, 1990, 898–908.
2 For example, otherwise admirable texts such as D. Farber, The Age of Great Dreams, New York, 1994;
and his edited collection The Sixties: FromMemory to History, Chapel Hill, 1994;M. Isserman andM. Kazin,
America Divided: The Civil War of the 1960s, Oxford, 2000; and A. Marwick, The Sixties: Cultural
Revolution in Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, c.1958–c.1974, Oxford, 1998, feature science and
technology in a perfunctory way. An exception is H. Brick, Age of Contradiction: American Thought and
Culture in the 1960s, New York, 1998.
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social movements, on which there is an immense literature. Wave Three features the
distinctive long-1960s strategy of analysis turned inward, of a self-critical self-
consciousness. The three waves are viewed not as consecutive events but as phenomena
that interfere, sometimes building on each other, sometimes cancelling each other out.
They are not conﬁned to one place, but nevertheless their meanings are locally under-
stood. Indeed, one of the main implications of this paper is that we need locally sensi-
tive but internationally comparative studies of the sciences and technology in the long
1960s. At present national stories of transnational phenomena are often accounted for
through nationally speciﬁc causes, which is inadequate.
The three-wave model organizes content from secondary literature in a way that
builds to make a positive and novel contribution to historians’ understanding of science
and technology in the twentieth century in general and the long 1960s in particular. The
three waves interfere to produce what I label a sea change. One measure of the help-
fulness of a periodization is the extent to which it prompts further questions, research
programmes and lines of inquiry. I will indicate where these appear and might lead.
The intention throughout has been to make bold, positive statements where possible.
If they are quibbled with, transformed or knocked down by future study I will not be
unhappy.
The ‘long 1960s’
No interesting periodization would have the 1960s beginning on New Year’s Day 1960
and ending on 31 December 1969. However, there is no consensus on when a long
1960s might begin or end.3 Subjects shape historiography. Historians of popular musi-
cal culture might choose a long 1960s that stretched from the birth of rock ’n’ roll
(1956, say) to Altamont (1969) or punk (1976).4 A media commentator has proposed a
long 1960s starting with the ﬁrst artiﬁcial satellite (1957), with its implications for
communications and surveillance, and ending with the media-saturated televisual
spectacle that was Watergate (1974).5 Social-movement historians have a surfeit of
dates, but one suggested long 1960s runs from Greensboro (1960) to the Congressional
approval of the Equal Rights Amendment (1972).6 Another might end with the United
States’ departure from Vietnam (1975). Historians narrowly focused on the history of
the New Left might choose a long 1960s from the formation of the Students for a
Democratic Society (SDS – 1960) to the internal splits over violent action that ended
SDS as a political force (1969). In The Sixties Arthur Marwick favours an economically
3 Note, too, that one can regard the long 1960s as containing critical moments of change without sub-
scribing to a ‘ long 1960s’. A plausible case can be made, for example, for the shattering importance of the
years 1971–4: the end of the Bretton Woods monetary exchange system (with its implications for how in-
vestments were permitted to ﬂow) and the oil crisis (with its consequent ﬂood of new petro-money to be
invested).
4 P. Friedlander, Rock and Roll: A Social History, Boulder, CO, 2006.
5 J. Hoberman, The Dream Life: Movies, Media, and the Mythology of the Sixties, New York, 2003,
11–12.
6 T. H. Anderson, The Movement and the Sixties, Oxford, 1995, 13.
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oriented long 1960s from the growing recognition of the economic power of youth
(c.1958) to the oil shock (c.1974).7
Other historians have identiﬁed shorter periods of profound ﬂux within the long
1960s. In such formulations, a ‘short 1960s’ might be sandwiched between the break-
down of the contained buttoned-down societies of the early Cold War and the recon-
struction of a diﬀerent order. Especially pertinent is Hollinger’s emphasis on the early
1960s. While rightly rejecting ‘The Sixties ’ as a ‘historiographic monster ’ that obscures
or even displaces true historical understanding, Hollinger insists that the early 1960s
witnessed a ‘number of important transformations, trajectories and tensions’ that de-
mand our attention.8 In particular, he gives a speciﬁc contextual argument for the rise of
a ‘radically reoriented learned discussion of the entire scientiﬁc enterprise’, not least
Kuhn’s Structure (1962), to be assessed later in this paper.
While these commentators disagree about dates, they agree that a period of unusual
transformation was contained within the long 1960s. Set against them, in principle if not
always in practice, are commentators who favour a chronological framework that
stresses continuity rather than discontinuity. Foremost among these accounts are those
that emphasize the Cold War as a continuing and primary organizing process. Still
more broadly, Hobsbawm proposes a ‘short twentieth century’ roughly coterminous
with the existence of the Soviet Union, in which the 1960s are demoted relative to the
outbreak and end of wars.9 Nevertheless, the ‘ long 1960s’ form a useful periodization
for historians of science and technology. The label draws attention to some continuity
of aspirations and attitudes, actions and institutions, that together were seen to be part
of a process of change. A plausible account of the long 1960s would credit both con-
tinuous and discontinuous features. In particular, the sciences and techniques promoted
under Cold War regimes were partly constitutive of long-1960s transformations.
‘Crisis ’ talk
To get a handle on what is at stake, drop in at Friends House, Euston Road, London in
November 1970. Over three days an average of seven hundred people per day gathered
at a meeting organized by the British Society for Social Responsibility in Science
(BSSRS) to discuss the Social Impact of Modern Biology.10 It is an exemplary gathering
for understanding the history of science in the long 1960s. Its overﬂowing attendance
suggests that it asked a question resonant for its audience. Many, perhaps, had come to
hear the ‘constellation of scientiﬁc superstars ’.11 But the conference was also unusual
7 Marwick, op. cit. (2), 7–8.
8 D. A. Hollinger, Science, Jews, and Secular Culture: Studies in Mid-twentieth Century American
Intellectual History, Princeton, 1996, 4–7.
9 E. J. Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991, London, 1994.
10 The politics, style, size and form of the BSSRS changed several times. Rosenhead has argued that until
1970 it can be thought of as a ‘classical operation with a distinguished and distinctive pedigree: the estab-
lishment of a leftish pressure group to enlighten a liberal elite without alarming it excessively’. J. Rosenhead,
‘BSSRS – ten years’, Science for People (1979), 43/44, 23–5. The proceedings of the conference can be found
in W. Fuller (ed.), The Social Impact of Modern Biology, London, 1971.
11 Rosenhead, op. cit. (10).
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for its breadth: speakers included not only establishment ‘superstars ’ but young radi-
cals, historians of science and technicians, while the voices from the ﬂoor were still
more diverse.12
The BSSRS was, crucially, both a revival and a neonate. Some of its advocates saw in
it a return to 1930s radicalism, while others saw novelty, a split that can only in-
adequately be mapped on to ‘old left ’ and ‘New Left ’. In February 1969 a core group of
scientists, including Maurice Wilkins, cosmic ray physicist and Nobel prizewinner Cecil
Frank Powell, medical scientist R. L. Smith, physicist D. K. Butt and young Imperial
College biochemist Steven Rose, were drumming up support for a new scientist–activist
movement. In a drive to ﬁnd one hundred sympathetic ‘prominent scientists ’, they
wrote to Joseph Needham:
Over the last few months a group of scientists brought together by a common concern for the
future of science and society have been discussing the need for an organisation which will be
concerned with the social responsibilities of the scientist. Many scientists have expressed their
concern at the new evidence of the abuse and moral compromise of science that is now oc-
curring. Thus the existence of classiﬁed scientiﬁc research in Universities, the current appli-
cation of science to techniques of chemical and biological warfare, the potential abuse of
discoveries in molecular biology, have and are giving rise to grave disquiet amongst scientists.
There has occurred a decline in morale among scientists and a loss of esteem for science in the
community at large. Furthermore, the future of science is threatened by the hostility now felt
by young people towards science. These developments we believe originate from the mis-use
and abuse of science.13
An inaugural meeting was held in April 1969, with addresses by an impressive roster
of professors.14 Over three hundred people attended, including the elderly and ill
J. D. Bernal. The audience, ‘healthily mixed, embracing ‘‘scientists, students and others
interested in science ’’ ’, were challenged by Maurice Wilkins, in what was to become
the keynote theme: ‘We have to face the fact that there is a crisis in science today. ’15
While debate centred on some familiar concerns such as the status of engineers and the
arts–science divide in secondary education, a sign of things to come came from the
intervention of a young statistician: ‘despite the plushy surroundings of this confer-
ence’, said Jonathan Rosenhead, ‘we have to face the fact that a lot of people are going
to be afraid that we are preaching subversion’. The BSSRS would indeed become a
broad church and it is precisely because its active membership stretched from elite
12 While some might feel that the meeting already conceded too much room, the radicals felt it nevertheless
‘ left little scope for those who were inexpert or poorly connected; indeed various steps were taken which had
the eﬀect of discouraging grass-roots activity by the membership’. Rosenhead, op. cit. (10).
13 Wilkins et al. to Needham, 20 February 1969, Cambridge University Library, Needham Papers.
Needham agreed to be a founder member. The archives of his papers are a major source of insight into the
changing nature of the BSSRS.
14 Speakers were Wilkins, Essex mathematician Professor G. A. Barnard, Sussex biologist Professor
J. Maynard Smith, R. L. Smith of St Mary’s Hospital Medical School, Powell, A. N. Oppenheim of the LSE,
and HeinzWolﬀ, who was at NIMR. Chairs included Professor E. H. S. Burlop, Steven Rose, Professor Henry
Miller (vice chancellor at Newcastle), and molecular biologist Professor Martin Pollock of Edinburgh.
15 ‘Inaugural meeting of BSSRS – April 19th Saturday’, undated. Cambridge University Library, Needham
Papers.
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scientists to ‘subversives ’, at least in the early years, that the society provides a good
case study of sea-change arguments.
At the meeting on the Social Impact of Modern Biology in 1970, Wilkins reminded
the audience again of the ‘crisis in science today [which] has not only direct bearing on
the question of our survival but is of deep signiﬁcance in relation to our fundamental
beliefs and our value-judgments’ :
The main cause is probably the Bomb: scientists no longer have their almost arrogant conﬁ-
dence in the value of science. At the same time non-scientists increasingly and openly question
the value of science. There are extremists who go further and object to rational thought as a
whole.16
Wilkins portrayed the scientiﬁc community as deeply split over its response to this
growing ‘breakdown in conﬁdence in reason’ among the many. Following the
use–abuse model, Wilkins concluded that it was vital not to ‘over-react’ lest this lead to
‘overall condemnation of science ’, but to be socially responsible and choose to pursue
science that, to borrow Peter Medawar’s phrase, provided ‘imaginative uplift ’.
Seventeenth-century natural philosophy had possessed this quality. It was
still possible today to catch some of that imaginative uplift. Consider for example the branch
of science that deals with nervous systems. Such science should not only lead to control of
nervous disorders but, by providing understanding of how the human brain works, should
throw new light on the nature of mind itself. The understanding should (to use hippie lan-
guage) expand the mind … [Such] self-knowledge should greatly inﬂuence our values. Science
is valuable, then, in terms of the self-knowledge that it gives.
Notice how this argument was structured. ‘Disturbances’, partly originating in ‘general
student unrest and political frustration’, but also originating ‘directly … with science,
with its organization and social priorities ’, contributed to a sense of ‘crisis ’, and this
‘crisis in science is only part of a larger cultural crisis ’. This in turn led to scrutiny of the
sciences in a form of self-analysis, leading to the valorization of science’s potential
contribution to self-knowledge. Wilkins ended by likening this ‘very critical phase in
the development of science ’ to another, ‘ the critical phase of the 17th century’. Where
that phase provoked experimental solutions such as the Royal Society, the current
phase called for more ‘experiments that may produce unexpected results ’.
Other elite ‘ leftish’ scientists made similar arguments. Fresh from his widely pub-
licized involvement in the 1968 Paris events, Jacques Monod proposed that science, as a
‘strictly objective approach to the analysis and interpretation of the universe … [which]
must ignore value judgements’, was destroying any and all ‘ traditional systems
of value’ :
Hence modern societies, living both economically and psychologically upon the technological
fruits of science, have been robbed, by science itself, of any ﬁrm, coherent, acceptable ‘belief ’
upon which to base their value systems. This, probably, is the greatest revolution that ever
occurred in human culture. I mean, again, the utter destruction, by science, by the systematic
pursuit of objective knowledge, of all belief systems, whether primitive or highly sophisticated,
16 M. Wilkins, ‘ Introduction’, in Fuller, op. cit. (10), 5–10.
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which had, for thousands of years, served the essential function of justifying the moral code
and the social structure.17
This ‘revolution’, argued Monod, was ‘at the very root of the modern mal du sie`cle ’,
especially among ‘the young’. When Monod looked out from the Institut Pasteur to see
the ‘revolution’ on the streets in 1968, one has to imagine him thinking the events were
caused by science.
The outsider physicist David Bohm presented a diﬀerent argument, although one
fully in tune with the preceding tone. Bohm’s involvement in radical student politics
while attending Berkeley in the 1930s had rebounded many times on his later life. He
had been barred from working at Los Alamos despite being Oppenheimer’s prote´ge´,
was ﬁred from Princeton after pleading the Fifth Amendment before the House Un-
American Activities Committee despite being Einstein’s co-worker, and had moved on
to Brazil and Israel before settling in England in 1957. Through the 1960s Bohm was
professor of theoretical physics at Birkbeck College, London. His paper at Friends
House portrayed science as an arrogant priesthood: he drew direct parallels with
medieval scholasticism, presumably having read Frances Yates. But he portrayed
problems in science as manifestations of a ‘general social condition: fragmentation’.
Fragmentation had been a key theme, too, of Wilkins’s talk, and Wilkins was clearly
intellectually indebted to Bohm in the way he thought of crises in science. Bohm pre-
scribed a new science of ‘holocyclation’ to unite a fractured world.
Wilkins was not the only contemporary commentator to identify ‘crises ’.18 Barry
Commoner, for example, had written in Science and Survival (1966) of the crises of
modern biology, by which he meant a science that was being torn apart by the conﬂict
between traditional organismic science, derived from natural history, and an aggressive
new molecular biology. But Wilkins’s ‘crisis ’ is interesting because he portrayed it as
a momentous condition aﬄicting the sciences more broadly. The point is not whether
Wilkins’s diagnosis was correct.19 Rather, it is that nearly all speakers at the con-
ference oﬀered their own, often very individual, folk theory of what was wrong. If
we look outside the conference we ﬁnd even more. A personal favourite is HeinzWolﬀ’s
‘container’ theory of modern crises. It turns out it is not that we lack theories of
what happened in the long 1960s, but rather that we have a diversity of divergent
accounts.
I will later examine the two talks, by Jacob Bronowski and Robert M. Young, that
were judged at the time, albeit by diﬀerent audiences, to have had the most electrifying
eﬀect. For now, note that the Social Impact of Modern Biology conference was large,
encompassed a broad spectrum of positions and attitudes among the speakers, and
provided a forum which aired sharply divergent accounts of what was amiss with
17 J. Monod, ‘On the logical relationship between knowledge and values’, in Fuller op. cit. (10), 11–12.
18 See D. Steigerwald, The Sixties and the End of Modern America, New York, 1995, 243–71, for 1960s
crises more generally.
19 The quantitative evidence, for example, is problematic. Amitai Etzioni and Clyde Z. Nunn reported the
results of the Louis Harris poll that the proportion of public expressing ‘great conﬁdence’ in the people
‘running science’ had dropped from 56% (1966) to 37% (1972). A. Etzioni and C. Z. Nunn, ‘Public views of
scientists’, Science (1973), 181, 1123. This, of course, was not a measure of conﬁdence in science.
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science. This divergence permitted Wilkins’s label of ‘crisis ’ to become a commonplace.
The meeting also witnessed divergent views on the very nature of scientiﬁc knowledge,
ranging from an establishment use–abuse model on one side to a radical critique of
scientiﬁc knowledge shaped by ideology on the other.
The question is : how did we get to a world where a gathering like the Social Impact
of Modern Biology was possible?
Sea change: three waves
Full fathom ﬁve thy father lies:
Of his bones are coral made:
Those are pearls that were his eyes :
Nothing of him that doth fade
But doth suﬀer a sea-change
Into something rich and strange.
The Tempest, Act I Scene ii
Something about science changed in the long 1960s. The aim here is to characterize
what changed and to analyse accounts of such change. In particular, I will describe
three waves of change that, together, amount to a sea change. Wave One can be called
the Balogh wave. In his unjustly neglected book, Chain Reaction: Expert Debate and
Public Participation in American Nuclear Power, 1945–1975 (1991), Brian Balogh
presented a model that accounted for how and why expert debate moved from a place
behind closed doors to become performance in public forums. Furthermore, the dy-
namic Balogh described provides a clue as to why a diversity of experts was generated
and was visible in the period that interests us. Once divergent expert views could be
compared in public then a host of critical questions followed. Why did experts dis-
agree? Did they share a ‘method’? If not, what could be said of a diversity of scientiﬁc
methods? Who was right? Who should say who was right? A historian can add to such
questions: was such disagreement new or was it the public scrutiny of disagreement that
was new?
Balogh’s model, which draws substantially on the work of the e´minence grise of
American environmental history, Samuel P. Hays, emphasized an internal organi-
zational dynamic that ﬁrst deepened reliance on experts, and placed them in private
opposition, then dragged the disagreements between experts into public view. But
Balogh does not have much to say about how expert knowledge was interpreted, re-
interpreted, used and countered within broader society. Speciﬁcally, to the ﬁrst wave we
must add a second. Social and cultural historians have appealed to social movements to
account for the energy, radicalism and tumultuous change of the long 1960s. Historians
of science need to draw on their work. We need to ask how science featured as subject,
object and tool of social movements – Wave Two. By doing so we will accomplish two
things. We will be able to understand what kind of public might be ready to turn the
regard of public disagreements between experts into something approaching distrust in
authorities, among a diversity of reactions. This will be whereWave One interferes with
Wave Two. But we will also be making a contribution to the general history of the long
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1960s, which discusses technology only in an abbreviated form and barely acknowl-
edges science at all. ‘Scientology’ and ‘science ﬁction’ may get index entries but ‘sci-
ence’ does so much less often.
Some of the best recent general histories of the long 1960s have stressed that along-
side familiar currents associated with the political left there ﬂourished not only an
intellectual resurgence on the right, but also, crucially, an entrepreneurialism or indi-
vidualism that was prominent throughout.20 Historians of science have demonstrated
that science in the 1970s and 1980s, particularly the life sciences, responded in new
ways to market demands and the forces of commercialization.21 The question of
Wave Three is simply this : what connections can be drawn between the distinctive
individualism and entrepreneurialism of the long 1960s and particular trends in the
sciences, including commercialization, sociobiological evolutionary arguments and
certain representations of the scientist in the late 1960s, 1970s and 1980s? Some general
history has begun to ask parallel questions.22 But my argument goes further than merely
an exercise in identifying and accounting for inﬂuences across decades. Wave Three
is the hardest to describe but also the most profound. Yet Wave Three can be identiﬁed
by common features of self-awareness, self-scrutiny, even self-analysis. This was a
self-consciousness that, even when inquiry was directed at other subjects, tended
towards self-description. Here I will call modern science studies as witness to its
own birth.
Wave One: the Balogh model
Balogh’s Chain Reaction described an institutional dynamic. It is superﬁcially a case
study of experts and expertise in and around the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC),
the civilian body set up in 1946 to manage the Manhattan Project inheritance of lab-
oratories, nuclear factories and nuclear policies in the US. In its early years, notes
Balogh, experts within the AEC designed policy agendas with little reference to public
demand. Experts might and did disagree, but debate was contained within AEC com-
mittees and boards and was invisible to an outside world. However, faced with ﬂagging
demand for the AEC’s product – electricity from nuclear power stations – the experts
and bureaucrats of the AEC were forced to appeal outwith the AEC in order to build
20 G. Andrews, R. Cockett, A. Hooper andM.Williams (eds.),New Left, New Right and Beyond: Taking
the Sixties Seriously, Basingstoke, 1999, on the New Right; Marwick, op. cit. (2), for entrepreneurialism
across movements in the long 1960s; Brick, op. cit. (2), 117, for entrepreneurialism, and 188–9, for the New
Right.
21 S. Krimsky, Genetic Alchemy: The Social History of the Recombinant DNA Controversy, Cambridge,
MA, 1982; S. Wright, ‘Recombinant DNA technology and its social transformation, 1972–1982’, Osiris
(1986), 2, 303–60; M. Kenney, Biotechnology: The University–Industrial Complex, New Haven, 1986;
D. Dickson, The New Politics of Science, Chicago, 1988, 243–60; S. Wright,Molecular Politics: Developing
American and British Regulatory Policy for Genetic Engineering, 1972–1982, Chicago, 1994; A. Thackray
(ed.), Private Science: Biotechnology and the Rise of the Molecular Sciences, Philadelphia, 1998; S. Smith
Hughes, ‘Making dollars out of DNA’, Isis (2001), 92, 541–75.
22 P. Jenkins,Decade of Nightmares: The End of the Sixties and the Making of Eighties America, Oxford,
2006.
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demand. Two processes were now combined. First, experts as specialists were oriented
towards divergent, even contradictory, missions. This divergence in institutional inter-
ests lay at the root of the internal disagreements that had taken place behind closed
doors. Diﬀerent positions were now being articulated outside the closed world of the
meeting rooms of the past. Second, external bodies were forced to employ more experts
in order to make sense of, and judgements on, the expert claims emanating from the
AEC. These experts, too, were specialists aligned to their particular bodies’ projects and
thus made diﬀerent cases in public, which in turn required further expert interpretation.
This institutional dynamic therefore created a demand for increasing numbers of ex-
perts (a ‘chain reaction’), and, as an unintended by-product, the conditions for the
spectacle of expert disagreement in public.
Balogh’s case study centred on one body (the AEC) in one country (the United States).
But I wish to draw attention to the model, not to its speciﬁc application. While the
‘chain reaction’ seems expressly invented to describe the dynamics of nuclear expertise,
Balogh’s model is generalizable. Hays has described a very similar dynamic in en-
vironmental policy-making over the same period.23 When the dynamic is placed
alongside good cultural histories of environmental science, such as Russell’s War and
Nature, a remarkably similar account can be built. So, for example, there existed expert
knowledge about the deleterious eﬀects of DDT from 1946, but assessments and argu-
ments were internal and not readily visible from outside.24 Only later, by the long
1960s, as we shall see, were there suﬃcient accessible divergent expert views about the
eﬀects of pesticides that they could be orchestrated to become a publicly visible conﬂict.
It is also quite likely that a Wave One-style analysis would explain why large databases
were not publicly regarded as a threat to personal privacy in the 1940s but suddenly
were so regarded in the early 1960s.25
Balogh’s model gives the demand-side picture that helps us understand one of the
supply-side features of the post-war decades : the rapid expansion and growth of higher-
education institutions. This growth entirely complemented the Cold War demand for
technical expertise relevant to building missiles, radar, nuclear warheads, eavesdrop-
ping networks and jet aircraft. Across the Western world, new universities were es-
tablished and old ones reformed and expanded to produce expert administrators of
what Balogh labels the ‘proministrative’ state. The proministrators were produced to
meet the demand for experts produced by Wave One, the Balogh institutional dynamic.
The dynamic is well described as a ‘chain reaction’, making splits in expertise publicly
visible and multiplying their number at each turn.
Though largely absent from Balogh’s own account, journalists and the changing
nature of journalism were critical to Wave One. First, at a simple level, the media were
carriers of expert views. Despite fears that the public was losing interest in science
stories, quantitative evidence suggests that readership of science and invention stories
23 See, for example, S. P. Hays, Explorations in Environmental History, Pittsburgh, 1998, 185–97.
24 E. Russell,War and Nature: Fighting Humans and Insects with Chemicals from World War I to Silent
Spring, Cambridge, 2001, 158–63.
25 J. Agar, The Government Machine, Cambridge, MA, 2003.
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increased during the later long 1960s.26 Second, journalists could ventriloquize, even
replace, expert voices. In this way, journalists would not merely represent experts but
anticipate and reconstruct what an expert might say. Finally, journalists became sour-
ces of criticism of science and also critics of other journalists insuﬃciently critical of
science. This kind of complaint became articulable: Science journalists ‘are a bunch of
patsies prone to uncritical acceptance of anything we are told by our authorities – our
authorities being doctors and scientists ’.27 In particular, the notion developed that sci-
ence reporters should report on science just as political reporters report on politics.
Daniel S. Greenberg writing in Science is perhaps the paradigmatic example. This was
an aspect, argues Nelkin, of the rise of the advocacy press, since to reject the received
form of objectivity in journalism, granting equal time to each side, was to be drawn into
further questioning of objectivity.28 The relevance to Wave One is that an advocacy
press based its authority on its own sources of expertise. Even some traditional science
journalists ‘adapted their writing to the spirit of the times’, becoming critical in the
long 1960s.29
But why should such diﬀerent Wave One dynamics all coincide in time? There are
two kinds of answer. First, the institutional dynamics producing experts were not in-
dependent. The demand for nuclear expertise, for example, created in its wake a de-
mand for ecological expertise.30 The demand for large computerized databases for
cryptanalysis and early-warning systems produced the technologies, such as symbol
searching, that were identiﬁed as threats to personal privacy. Second, the unparalleled
military improvisation of technical projects in the Second World War, further re-
inforced by the immediate start of the Cold War, provided a common starting point for
these institutional dynamics. In short, in the years around 1945 experts were likely to be
hidden in internal committees, while by the long 1960s they were more numerous and
more likely to be drawn into conﬂicting positions. The moment of the long 1960s took
the form it did because an institutional dynamic softened a rigid enclosure of expertise
that contingently and extraordinarily was set in place in the mid-twentieth century.
We can see, however, what is explanatorily missing from Wave One and what is
needed from Wave Two. Balogh’s model does not indicate where and why the agents
emerged who could turn observable discord into observed discord. It certainly does not
describe the interests, demands, cultures, motives or lives of these observers. Nor does
Wave One explain who the orchestrators of expert disagreement might be.31 Wave Two
26 C. Z. Nunn, ‘ Is there a crisis of conﬁdence in science?’, Science (1977), 198, 995.
27 Henry Pierce of the Pittsburgh Post Gazette, 1966, quoted in D. Nelkin, Selling Science: How the Press
Covers Science and Technology, New York, 1995 (revised edition; ﬁrst published 1987), 89.
28 Nelkin, op. cit. (27), 89–93.
29 Nelkin, op. cit. (27), 93. Nelkin oﬀers as an example David Perlman, whose career stretched from the
1950s to the 1980s, but whose tone became critical around 1972.
30 See discussion of the Odums in J. B. Hagen, An Entangled Bank: The Origins of Ecosystem Ecology,
New Brunswick, 1992.
31 Indeed, institutionalist Wave One literature can actively reject the importance of such orchestrators.
Examine the scarcity of references to Rachel Carson, for example, in S. P. Hays, A History of Environmental
Politics since 1945, Pittsburgh, 2000. Or again: ‘The entire subject of environmental aﬀairs is attributed to the
writings and ideas of some widely read author such as Rachel Carson or Paul Ehrlich, when, in fact, the source
of those aﬀairs is found far more in the immediate human circumstances that people experience. ’ S. P. Hays,
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will tell us that the observers were members of new social movements and the orches-
trators key ﬁgures in such movements.
Wave Two: social movements
Social movements were highly visible features of long-1960s politics and culture.
Studies of Wave Two, the wave carried by social movements, make up the vast bulk of
literature on the period. The relevant question here is : what roles must social move-
ments play in an account of changing science in the long 1960s?
‘Social movements ’ were the constructs of social science as much as social move-
ments were its objects of study. In a process reminiscent of Balogh’s model, social
scientiﬁc expertise about social movements proliferated from the 1950s to the 1960s.
Studies ranged from collective-behaviour theory, drawing on traditional work on the
irrationality of crowds, through Marxist accounts, to New Social Movement ap-
proaches, which signiﬁcantly emphasized the importance of self-identiﬁcation,
Goﬀman-inspired frame accounts and a variety of other theoretical stances.32 Among
these approaches were those that picked out an oppositional core to social movements,
a ‘counter-culture’.33 Nevertheless, for example, the proportion of American students
who identiﬁed with a ‘counter-culture’ was tiny compared to those who were sustained
and changed by social movements more generally.34
This secondary literature and ﬁrst-hand accounts allow a number of features of
social movements to be made out. First, social movements had a distinctive ﬂuid, net-
work form. While there were prominent spokespeople, heroes and revered ancestors,
each social movement was a patchwork of sometimes short-lived organizations and
campaigns. What gave a social movement cohesion was a rough consensus on ultimate
targets, such as nuclear disarmament or the removal of racism. Such targets were
boundary objects that enabled coordination within the network-like movement. The
presence of targets strongly promoted a polarized culture that structured much of the
literature, speeches, actions and identities of the movements. Social movements thus
shared an oppositional tone. This matches a cliche´ : if there were common targets
across the social movements of the long 1960s, then they would include opposition
to ‘authority’, the ‘hierarchy’, the ‘establishment’, ‘ technocracy’,35 the ‘system’,
‘ the man’.
‘Introduction: an environmental historian amid the thickets of environmental politics’, in idem, op. cit. (23),
8–11, 14–25.
32 D. della Porta and M. Diani, Social Movements: An Introduction, Oxford, 1999; M. Giugni,
D.McAdam and C. Tilly (eds.),How Social MovementsMatter, Minneapolis, 1999; A. E. Hunt,The Turning:
A History of Vietnam Veterans against the War, New York, 1999.
33 P. Braunstein and M. W. Doyle, ‘Historicizing the American counterculture of the 1960s and ’70s’, in
Imagine Nation: The American Counterculture of the 1960s and ’70s (ed. P. Braunstein and M. W. Doyle),
London, 2002, 5–14; T. Roszak, The Making of a Counter Culture, Berkeley, 1995 (ﬁrst published 1968).
34 Roszak, op. cit. (33), 40. Anderson, op. cit. (6), 17. Furthermore, only 13% of US college students in
1969 identiﬁed themselves as ‘new left ’ (and only 3% outside of college).
35 Roszak, op. cit. (33).
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Second, social movements learnt from each other, exchanging and transmitting
members, ideas and techniques.36 The relevant social movements here include, but
are not restricted to, civil rights, anti-nuclear movements, anti-Vietnam movements,
political activism typiﬁed by umbrella groups such as SDS, new environmentalism
and feminism. Each movement, but in particular the civil rights movement of the
1950s, became a model for later movements, just as they in turn drew inspiration,
techniques and other lessons from even earlier tides of activism, including the anti-
slavery campaigns of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Collectively, there was a
‘Movement’, a term with considerable resonance. It is an actors’ category, while as an
analyst’s category it emphasizes the social foundations of historical change. Some
authors map the long 1960s precisely onto the rise and fall of these social movements
that made up the Movement. Others insist on a less rigidly institutional analysis.
Anderson, for example, insists that ‘movement’ is a useful term when it ‘connotes all
activists who demonstrated for social change. Anyone could participate: There were no
membership cards. Sara Evans, a civil rights volunteer, later wrote, ‘‘Above all the term
‘movement’ was self-descriptive. There was no way to join; you simply announced or
felt yourself to be part of the movement ’’’.37
Equipped with a sense of these terms we can now see how science ﬁgures in Wave
Two. Science and scientists featured in social movements in three relationships. First,
certain scientists and sciences were objects of criticism because they were seen within
social movements as tools of their opponents. Second, places where science was done
became theatres for social-movement demonstration. Third, scientists-as-activists were
contributors to social movements. This third relationship took two forms: their science
could be incidental to their involvement in a movement, or, most signiﬁcantly, it could
be the cause, the tool, the object and subject of activism. The cases considered below
involve all three of these relationships.
The civil rights and anti-nuclear movements furnish candidates for science-as-an-
object-of-criticism. Henry E. Garrett, professor and head of the psychology department
at Columbia University, testiﬁed in support of segregation in the Davis vs County
School Board case of 1952.38 He argued against anthropological studies of the Franz
Boas school, and against the position held by Ashley Montagu, who had led the
UNESCO 1950 statement on race which questioned typological conceptions of race and
innate racial diﬀerences in intelligence. Psychological evidence was also integral to the
case that overturned the conclusions of Davis vs County School Board – Brown vs
Board of Education (1954).39 In such cases science-as-the-tool-of-the-opponent (Garrett
and others) was countered by expert testimony (such as Montagu’s) mobilized by
bodies within the civil rights movement such as the National Association for the
36 Mendelsohn, op. cit. (1), 159.
37 Anderson, op. cit. (6), p. x.
38 A. S. Winston, ‘Science in the service of the Far Right: Henry E. Garrett, the IAAEE, and the Liberty
Lobby’, Journal of Social Issues (1998), 54, 179–210. W. H. Tucker, The Science and Politics of Racial
Research, Urbana, 1994.
39 J. P. Jackson, Jr, ‘Creating a consensus: psychologists, the Supreme Court, and school desegregation,
1952–1955’, Journal of Social Issues (1998), 54, 143–77.
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Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). The environmental–hereditarian contro-
versy continued after civil rights legislation was enacted. Arthur Jensen and William
Shockley appealed directly to reactionary public individuals and groups in the 1960s
and the 1970s, an appeal rebutted, also in public, by critics. The end eﬀect, as in Wave
One, was ‘socially visible’ disagreement.40
At ﬁrst glance, nuclear science is also a candidate for science-as-an-object-of-
criticism. Britain’s Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), for example, chose the
UK’s nuclear weapons laboratory, Aldermaston, as terminus of its Easter marches. But
such an analysis is too simplistic. CND’s focus, as a lived experience, was as much on
the self as on the products of Cold War science.41 As we shall see, this is an early
intimation of Wave Three. CND was a form of revivalism: religious ﬁgures, organi-
zations and language, not least J. B. Priestley’s ‘moral crusade’, framed the protests.
These were protests against the immorality of defending aﬄuent society with nuclear
weapons.42 Nevertheless, CND also illustrates social movements’ capacity to provide
temporary institutions in which to learn what was possible. In the words of one com-
mentator, it was a ‘visible social alternative’, even an ‘imminent counter-culture that
merged personal expressiveness with political activism’, an exemplary ‘march of the
dissenting young’.43
From the days of the Manhattan Project, scientists oﬀered the ‘most serious resist-
ance to the use of the Bomb’, but their critique was of use (and abuse) rather than of the
science.44 Nevertheless, there were seeds of a critique of use–abuse instrumentalism.
While science was seen by some as a neutral tool that was being abused rather than well
used, for CND nuclear science was a tool it would rather did not exist in the world.
A case could thence be made that, from Leo Szilard onwards, nuclear control or
disarmament campaigns were one source of a major intellectual strand of the sea
change because they prompted questions about the neutrality of science. Scientists’
arguments could be appropriated and reinterpreted as more generalized critiques.45
But the moral-crusade rhetoric of CND and aligned bodies supplanted rather than
complemented scientist-led critiques of nuclear weapon policy. Before 1958, many
40 Y. Ezrahi, ‘The authority of science in politics’, in Science and Values: Patterns of Tradition and
Change (ed. A. Thackray and E. Mendelsohn), New York, 1974, 215–51, 232: ‘ the principal audience of the
debate was not so much the scientiﬁc community itself but the lay public, the contestants were naturally led to
invest much eﬀort in building indirect evidence through which science is made more socially visible in order to
persuade the public that their opinion is more representative of the true scientiﬁc consensus than that of their
rivals’.
41 F. Parkin, Middle Class Radicalism, Manchester, 1968; J. Mattausch, A Commitment to Campaign:
A Sociological Study of CND, Manchester, 1989.
42 V. Bogdanor and R. Skidelsky, Age of Aﬄuence, 1951–1964, London, 1970.
43 Nigel Young, quoted in J. Green, All Dressed Up: The Sixties and Counterculture, London, 1999, 24–5.
44 L. S. Wittner, The Struggle against the Bomb, Volume 1,One World or None: A History of the World
Nuclear Disarmament Movement through 1953, Stanford, 1993, 29.
45 A possible example is the accusation made by the Greater St Louis Committee for Nuclear Information
that Edward Teller had ‘a vested interest in arguing that atomic fallout was not harmful. In response, Teller
attacked CNI member Edward U. Condon’s claim that fallout was dangerous, claiming that it was politically
motivated and suspect scientiﬁcally because Condon had been investigated by the House Un-American
Activities Committee’. K. Moore, ‘Organizing integrity: American science and the creation of public interest
organizations, 1955–1975’, American Journal of Sociology (1996), 101, 1592–627, 1614.
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prominent interventions had been led by scientists. Examples include the Chicago sci-
entists’ opposition to the use of the Bomb before Hiroshima, the foundation of the
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, the Russell–Einstein manifesto of 1955, the ﬁrst Pugwash
conference of 1957 and the petition organized by Linus Pauling in 1957–8, signed by
11,038 scientists from forty-nine countries, including thirty-seven Nobel laureates.46
Scientists were not so prominent after 1958.47
Social movements learnt from each other. In many ways, environmental activists
appropriated the roles and arguments of activist nuclear scientists. For example, Rachel
Carson repeatedly drew parallels between radiation and pesticides in arguments in
Silent Spring (1962). She could be conﬁdent that her reference to Lucky Dragon, the
Japanese ﬁshing vessel contaminated by fallout, would be familiar to her audience. An
audience that had sat, terriﬁed, through the Cuban missile crisis, could translate from
the eﬀects of one known insidious invisible contaminant to make another unknown
meaningful and alarming.
Carson is an exemplary Wave Two orchestrator, and Silent Spring an exemplary
Wave Two text. In the early 1950s at the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), Carson had
been able to sit at the centre of three networks. First, the reports of diﬀerent experts
such as oceanographers, marine biologists, ornithologists and ecologists crossed her
desk, an obligatory passage point in the FWS’s review process. Second, through her
contacts with bodies such as the Audubon and Wilderness societies, Carson was in
touch with naturalists and nature writers. Finally, through her skilful agent she could
tap the resources of the publishing world. This position, combined with an enviable gift
of expression, provided the basis for the publishing successes of The Sea Around Us
(1951) and Silent Spring. More importantly, Carson was ideally placed to orchestrate
the public display of expert diﬀerence.48 This staging and demonstration of expert dis-
agreement is at the heart of Silent Spring. Wave One had produced the experts and
divergent expert views. Wave Two presented and observed these divergent views in
public and linked them to the causes of social movements. Carson issued a call to arms.
The public that ‘endures ’ pesticide eﬀects had the right to know and an obligation to
act. The members of social movements, in this case the new environmentalism, pro-
vided the core readership and audience for Carson’s public orchestration. New readers,
in turn, became potential new members, a growing audience that could be upset, con-
cerned and eventually curious about rival expert claims. Social movements were re-
sourceful institutions that could sustain scrutiny of expertise. Barry Commoner
46 L. S. Wittner, The Struggle against the Bomb, Volume 2, Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World
Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954–1970, Stanford, 1997, 39.
47 For the criticism of scientist–activists by strategic analysts, such as Albert Wohlstetter and Herman
Kahn in the context of 1960s debates, see S. Hong, ‘Man and machine in the 1960s’, Techne´ (2004), 7, 49–77.
48 For example, Jamison and Eyerman note, ‘What made it valuable and useful for the movement that
eventually took form around its message was its discussion of the alternative ecological solution, ‘‘ the other
road’’ [i.e. biological controls] … As she outlined those alternatives, she once again, as in all her writings, let
the scientists themselves speak, bringing not only people but dispute, contradiction, diﬀerence of opinion into
the world of the expert. Perhaps even more important than the particular conﬂict she wrote about – between
chemical and biological insect control – was the presentation of conﬂict itself ’. A. Jamison and R. Eyerman,
Seeds of the Sixties, Berkeley, 1994, 99–100. My emphasis.
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addressed this moment explicitly : ‘ If two protagonists claim to know as scientists,
through the merits of the methods of science, the one that nuclear testing is essential to
the national interest, the other that it is destructive of the national interest, where lies
the truth?’ The fact that the ‘thoughtful citizen’ has to ask ‘How do I know which
scientist is telling the truth?’ ‘ tells us that the public is no longer certain that sci-
entists – all of them – ‘‘ tell the truth’’. ’49
This is the model through which the sea change could orchestrate the appearance of
crisis. The situation in which a concerned witness is confronted by a spectacle of expert
disagreement was replicated many times as Wave One interfered with Wave Two. If
asked to choose, the witness was faced with a diﬃcult choice between two experts, each
claiming to ‘know as scientists ’. The slippage identiﬁed by Commoner, the slide from
challenges to some scientists to doubt in Science (‘all of them’) was invited by this
situation. It is a situation that called yet again for the production of more experts. As we
see below, science studies has a self-interest in this moment.
A second slippage was a common feature of social movements. Competition for
activists’ attention, time and resources, in combination with the loose organizational
structure of movements, encouraged movement between movements. For example,
there is some evidence that campaigns against war in Vietnam weakened disarmament
activism.50 Alternatively, social movements could run together if the targets, good
boundary objects, proved ﬂexible enough to coordinate action among very diﬀerent
groups. Feenberg’s account of the May 1968 events can be translated into these terms.
Surveying more broadly the ‘dramatic shift in attitudes toward technology that oc-
curred in the 1960s’, it was ‘not so much technology’, he notes, ‘as rising technocracy
that provoked public hostility’.51 In Paris, in particular, when the university was read as
a technocratic society in miniature, the students could make common cause with
workers’ movements and with French middle strata. In May 1968 student demon-
strations closed universities, ten million strikers joined them and opposition to the
establishment ‘exploded among teachers, journalists, employees in the ‘‘culture
industry’’, social service workers and civil servants, and even among some middle lower
level business executives ’.52 Here positive notions of ‘autonomy’ acted as a common
coordinating thread. Calls for autonomy were not calls for severance from society but
identiﬁcation with the ‘people’ against technocratic masters. ‘While the May Events
did not succeed in overthrowing the state’, summarizes Feenberg, the ferment starting
on the French campuses ‘accomplished something else of importance, an anti-techno-
cratic redeﬁnition of the idea of progress that continues to love in a variety of forms to
this day’.53 When revolutionary ideals were scaled back to ‘modest realizable goals ’,
a successful new micropolitics of technology emerged.54
49 B. Commoner, Science and Survival, London, 1971 (ﬁrst published 1966), 127. My emphasis.
50 For example, Wittner, op. cit. (46), 455.
51 A. Feenberg, Questioning Technology, London, 1999, 4.
52 Feenberg, op. cit. (51), 31.
53 Feenberg, op. cit. (51), 43.
54 Feenberg’s examples are client-centred professionalism, ‘changed medical practices in ﬁelds such as
childbirth and experimentation on human subjects’, participatory management and design, ‘communication
applications of computers’, and ‘environmentally conscious technological advance’.
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Like the Paris streets, American campuses became theatres for anti-technocracy
protest. At Berkeley, the Free Speech Movement, which began in 1964 and grew from
civil rights campaigns, launched a tide of student activism. By the following year
Berkeley campus was a centre of anti-Vietnam protest and organization. The Vietnam
War, notes Feenberg, ‘was conceived by the US government and sold to the public as a
technical problem American ingenuity could quickly solve’.55 Edgar Friedenberg’s re-
sponse to the call by the president of UC Berkeley for universities to be ‘multiversities ’,
putting knowledge at the disposal of society’s powers (not least the military), was to call
instead for the university to be ‘society’s specialized organ of self-scrutiny’.56 At
Princeton military-sponsored research was ﬁercely debated from 1967, pitting activist
engineers such as Steve Slaby against Cold Warrior scientist Eugene Wigner, who li-
kened the actions of the SDS to those of Nazi students.57 Protest ﬁzzled after one ﬁnal
summer of strikes in 1970 and a committee (chaired by Thomas Kuhn) reported that
Princeton had relatively little military-sponsored research.58 At Stanford student and
faculty protests against secret contracts and classiﬁed research began in 1966. ‘The
extent of Stanford’s classiﬁed research program’, centred at the Applied Electronics
Laboratory and the Stanford Research Institute (home to counter-insurgency projects),
writes Leslie, ‘although common knowledge among the engineers, shocked an aca-
demic community still coming to terms with the Vietnam War’.59 In 1967 a Stanford
‘student-run alternative college ’, the Experiment, called for the indictment of university
oﬃcials and trustees for ‘war crimes’, while the Experiment and the local SDS chapter
organized antiwar marches and campaigns.60 April 1969 saw the occupation of the
Applied Engineering Laboratory by protesters.
SDS had also organized a small sit-in against Dow Chemical at MIT in November
1967, but it was federal defence contracts at the university that triggered vehement
opposition.61 MIT received more defence research and development grants than any
other university. Its Lincoln and Instrumentation laboratories, specializing in electron-
ics and missile guidance technologies respectively, as well as the independent but
adjacent MITRE labs, were very much part of the Cold War ‘ﬁrst line of defence’.
Nevertheless, at MIT, the conversion in 1967 of the Fluid Mechanics Laboratory,
from missiles, jet engines and re-entry physics to environmental and medical research,
55 Feenberg, op. cit. (51), 4.
56 Edgar Friedenberg, ‘LA of the intellect ’, New York Review of Books, 14 November 1963, 11–12,
discussed in Brick, op. cit. (2), 24–5.
57 M. Wisnioski, ‘Inside ‘‘ the system’’ : engineers, scientists, and the boundaries of social protest in the
long 1960s’, History and Technology (2003), 19, 313–33.
58 Wisnioski, op. cit. (57), 320.
59 S. W. Leslie, The Military–Industrial–Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford, New York, 1993, 242.
The implication is that the technicians and scientists working directly on the defence projects were on the
whole unsympathetic to the protesters. Likewise at MIT one graduate student told a reporter, ‘What I’m
designing may one day be used to kill people. I don’t care. I’m given an interesting technological problem and I
get enjoyment out of solving it. ’ ‘Most [laboratory workers] blamed the trouble on outside agitators with no
sense of the laboratory’s real mission or accomplishments. ’ Leslie, op. cit., 238.
60 Leslie, op. cit. (59), 242–4.
61 Leslie, op. cit. (59), 235. Dow Chemical had sought graduate recruits.
582 Jon Agar
provided an exemplar for the protesters.62 In January 1969 MIT faculty members called
a strike intended to ‘provoke ‘‘a public discussion of problems and dangers related to
the present role of science and technology in the life of our nation’’ ’.63 The protesters’
manifesto of 4 March called for ‘turning research applications away from the present
emphasis on military technology toward the solution of pressing environmental and
social problems’.64 A tense standoﬀ between protesters and Instrumentation
Laboratory boss Charles Stark Draper was broken by a riot, featuring police dogs and
tear gas, in November 1969. In both the MIT and Stanford cases the moderate pro-
testers won. The Instrumentation Laboratory was divested from MIT to become the
independent Charles Stark Draper Laboratory in 1970, while the Stanford Research
Institute was also divested and its campus annex, the theatre of protest, closed. The
radicals had wanted conversion. All the divested Cold War laboratories prospered un-
der continued defence patronage and with continuing ties with the adjacent, if now
formally independent, universities.65
The campuses and laboratory plazas were indeed theatres of demonstration.
Furthermore, the establishment of new bodies indicates that much else was at stake.
MIT students and faculty initiated the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) in 1969. In
a link back from Vietnam to disarmament, what started as a concern about campus
contributions to the war in South East Asia shifted in the 1970s to a critique of nuclear
safety issues.66 The UCS was particularly active in the second Cold War period of the
1980s, organizing a report that in many ways was an echo of Pauling’s 1957–8 peti-
tion.67 The UCS, alongside the Scientists’ Institute for Public Information (SIPI, formed
in 1963) and Science for the People (SftP, founded in 1969 ‘as a group dedicated to
ﬁnding ways to take political and social action against the war in Vietnam’) have all
been studied by the sociologist Kelly Moore, who has oﬀered an interesting general
argument.68 Moore argues that ‘public interest science organizations’, such as UCS,
SIPI and SftP, were an institutional response to a severe quandary posed by the mixture
of political activism and the sciences :
Activist scientists had to be politically critical of science without suggesting that the content of
scientiﬁc knowledge might be tainted by non-scientiﬁc values …More speciﬁcally, they faced
two related problems. First, their activities and claims threatened to fragment professional
organizations that represented ‘pure’ science and unity among scientists. Second, once the
discussion became public, it threatened to reveal the subjective nature of problem choices,
methods, and interpretations because it focused attention on the relationship between spon-
sors of science and scientiﬁc knowledge.69
62 See Wisnioski, op. cit. (57), 323, for discussion of this conversion as pragmatic rather than ideological.
63 B. Magasanik, J. Ross and V. Weisskopf, ‘No research strike at MIT’, Science (1969), 163, 517, quoted
in Leslie, op. cit. (59), 233.
64 Leslie, op. cit. (59), 233. See also J. Allen (ed.), March 4: Students, Scientists, and Society, Cambridge,
MA, 1970.
65 Leslie, op. cit. (59), 250.
66 L. S. Wittner, The Struggle against the Bomb, Volume 3, Toward Nuclear Abolition: A History of the
World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1971 to the Present, Stanford, 2003, 11.
67 Wittner, op. cit. (46), 172–3.
68 Moore, op. cit. (45), 1592–627.
69 Moore, op. cit. (45), 1594.
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Such tensions were reconciled, argues Moore, through the formation of public-interest
science organizations. They ‘made serving the public interest relatively permanent and
durable, obfuscated how political interests aﬀect scientiﬁc knowledge, and helped
preserve the organizational representations of scientiﬁc unity : professional science or-
ganizations’. In other words, The UCS, SIPI and SftP functioned to preserve the purity
of bodies such as MIT, the American Association for the Advancement of Science and
the American Physical Society, respectively.70 Also clearly revealed in Moore’s study is
the extent to which this institutional response was provoked by the problem that ‘at-
tention was increasingly being drawn to multiple interpretations of scientiﬁc evi-
dence – certainly not a desirable state of aﬀairs for a profession that relies more so than
others on the presentation of unanimity on rules, methods, and interpretations ’.71
While she does not cite Balogh or Hays, Moore’s account is clearly compatible with the
Balogh model sketched in Wave One. Science for the People is the body that ﬁts
Moore’s analysis least well. Established as Scientists for Social and Political Action in
1969 (later adding ‘and Engineers’ to become SESPA), Science for the People produced
a bimonthly magazine (reaching a circulation of two thousand), squabbled internally
and organized protests between 1969 and 1972, not least at AAAS meetings.72 After
1972 Science for the People quietened. By the late 1970s it had ‘evolved into a moder-
ate, more biology-directed group, focussing on issues such as Sociobiology’.73 It closed
in 1991. Nevertheless, before then it was a direct and tangible inﬂuence on the BSSRS.
Once these public-interest science organizations had been formed, to preserve the purity
of core scientiﬁc organizations the protagonists were constrained to deploy use/misuse
rhetoric and avoid discussions of the shaping of scientiﬁc content by interests.74
Wave Three
Wave One was an institutional dynamic that dragged experts into public display.
Disagreement between experts, previously private, was now potentially publicly visible.
Wave Two concerned the growth and actions of new social movements. The social
movements provided the reason, people and resources. They cultivated the skills
necessary to turn disagreement between experts into opposition to experts identiﬁed
70 The best single piece of evidence is the following response to the call for the APS to take a stand on the
Vietnam War: ‘It would be unwise and uncalled for to jeopardize the purely scientiﬁc nature of the APS and
the harmony between its members by introducing politics in any form and of any denomination. Let those
who must begin their own society.’ Goetz Oertel, letter to editor of Physics Today, February 1968, quoted in
Moore, op. cit. (45), 1610.
71 Moore, op. cit. (45), 1608. Her emphasis (and an emphasis that works here too). The quotation is
discussing Barry Commoner’s experience in setting up the Greater St Louis Committee for Nuclear
Information (CNI), precursor to SIPI, and is clearly in line with the account of Commoner above.
72 Wisnioski, op. cit. (57), 325–6.
73 Wisnioski, op. cit. (57), 327.
74 Moore explicitly argues that focusing on ‘misuse’ of science was a ploy to avoid the ‘serious problems’
raised by ‘multiple interpretations of evidence [that] were possible among scientists, undermining the claims
of scientists to universal standards of interpretation’ that arose in publicly observed controversy. Moore, op.
cit. (45), 1613.
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with the targets of social movements, and, more profoundly, into questions about the
nature of expertise. Wave Three is given cohesion by common features all concerning
the ‘self ’ in the long 1960s. It is a commonplace that the post-war baby-boom gener-
ation held attitudes in opposition to those of their parents’ generation. More signiﬁcant
is the observation that the baby-boom generation identiﬁed and analysed themselves as
diﬀerent.75
Self-consciousness emerged as a theme in elite intellectual thought partly as a reac-
tion against overbearing systematization. The dominant social science was quantitative
and scientistic in method and, in the words of Hollinger, ‘ triumphalist ’ in spirit,
‘marked by the buzzwords modernization theory and the end of ideology’.76 But the
books of Daniel Bell and Walt Rostow, while governing policy, were not the texts
deemed inﬂuential among the members of social movements in the long 1960s. The
texts and authors that were inﬂuential had a common theme of overbearing structural
determination and the limits on responses of the individual. The works of Marcuse can
be glossed as such.77 Another text, to be discussed in more detail because it relates to the
sociology of science and technology, is Jacques Ellul’s Technological Society. An aca-
demic theologian from Bordeaux, Ellul would not have reached such a wide anglo-
phone audience were it not for a fortunate intervention by Aldous Huxley. The author
of Brave New World recommended an obscure French text, Ellul’s La Technique
(1954), to the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions of the Fund for the
Republic, Inc., Santa Barbara, and its translation and dissemination became the
favoured project of the publisher Alfred A. Knopf. With a foreword by the foremost
sociologist of science in the United States, Robert K. Merton, The Technological
Society was published in 1964.
Ellul’s argument concerned the expansion of ‘technique’, an omnivorous entity de-
ﬁned as ‘the totality of methods rationally arrived at and having absolute eﬃciency (for
a given stage of development) in every ﬁeld of human activity ’.78 Technique did not
merely mean machines, a crucial point for Ellul. Indeed, machines were merely one
human creation that had been absorbed by technique. Technique had agency beyond
human control. It was autonomous; it ‘ integrates everything’. While technique was as
old as human societies, it had particularly fastened its grip as the methods of the
‘technical revolution’ of the late eighteenth century – economic, mechanical, military,
administrative and police innovations – had been assimilated.79 Ellul’s was therefore an
75 Ravetz, too, emphasizes demographic forces – an aﬄuent, marketeered, free youth – underpinning cri-
tique. Ravetz, op. cit. (1).
76 D. A. Hollinger, ‘Science as a weapon in Kulturkampfe in the United States during and after WorldWar
II ’, Isis (1995), 86, 440–54, 450; emphasis removed.
77 Marcuse’s analysis is framed within his concept of an ‘advanced industrial society’. Technology was
part of this, and science, in turn, part of technology. Marcuse’s framework therefore invited critiques of
science, particularly from his New Left readership, as part of a critique of advanced industrial society.
‘Revolutionary consciousness-raising’ was a strategy proposed in H. Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man:
Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society, Boston, 1964.
78 J. Ellul, The Technological Society, tr. John Wilkinson, New York, 1964, 25.
79 Ellul, op. cit. (78), 43.
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extreme version of an industrial-modernism thesis. ‘Modern technique’ was rational
and artiﬁcial : these were two characteristics Ellul admitted other authors had noticed.
But it was also ‘self-directing’ and self-augmenting, and formed a whole in which any
diﬀerentiations were secondary. The twentieth century had witnessed the further
spread of technique into all human aﬀairs, a quantitative but not qualitative develop-
ment. Ellul’s analysis had clear parallels with Martin Heidegger’s answer to the ques-
tion concerning technology, a lecture (and then essay) that also only reached a receptive
audience in the long 1960s.80
Before discussing how Ellul portrayed science’s relationship with technique, one
should highlight an aspect of his account that distinguishes it decisively from later
sociology of technology. Ellul is often held up as a straw man. His arguments, it
is claimed, are as close as sophisticated arguments get to a position of technological
determinism. But this caricature depends on confusion between ‘technology’ and
‘technique’. Even if technology is understood broadly as the sum of material devices,
know-how and the social systems within which they operate, technique was a still more
encompassing concept. Ellul would admit, although he was inconsistent on this point,
that humans could choose between technologies. But he dismissed outright the
suggestion that humans could reject technique: ‘Every rejection of a technique judged
to be bad entails the application of a new technique, the value of which is estimated
from the point of view of eﬃciency alone’ :81
The human being is no longer in any sense the agent of choice. Let no one say that man is the
agent of technical progress … and that it is he who chooses among possible techniques. In
reality, he neither is nor does anything of the sort.82
This should be read as a statement of human impotence in the face of technique.
Choosing technologies was a case of shuﬄing deckchairs on the Titanic.
Ellul oﬀered no way out, except by challenging individuals to strive to ‘transcend’
technique. This signiﬁcant exception helps us understand why Ellul was read in the long
1960s:
At stake is our very life, and we shall need all the energy, inventiveness, imagination, goodness,
and strength we can muster to triumph in our predicament … [E]ach of us, in his own life,
must seek ways of resisting and transcending technological determinants …
Wemust look at it dialectically, and say that man is indeed determined, but that it is open to
him to overcome necessity, and that this very act is freedom. Freedom is not static but dy-
namic; not a vested interest, but a prize continually to be won …
In the modern world, the most dangerous form of determinism is the technological
phenomenon. It is not a question of getting rid of it, but, by an act of freedom, of transcending
it. How is this to be done? I do not yet know.83
80 ‘Die Frage nach der Technik’ as a lecture dates from 1949. It was published in a collection of essays in
1954.
81 Ellul, op. cit. (78), 110.
82 Ellul. op. cit. (78), 80.
83 Ellul, op. cit. (78), 32–3.
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It is not hard here to detect an echo of personalism, the communitarian philosophy
produced within 1930s Catholic theology that shaped Ellul’s early thinking and which
has been claimed as a major inﬂuence on radical thought in the long 1960s.84
Ellul’s pessimism was therefore leavened by a glimpse of salvation. But human
‘choice’ between technologies was relegated to minor, negligible status. On this matter
of choice, Ellul was utterly at odds with the new sociology of technology that developed
alongside the sociology of scientiﬁc knowledge in the 1970s and 1980s. This new soci-
ology can be characterized as providing, ﬁrst and foremost, models of technological
change in which human choices are paramount, even if the capacity to choose is not
evenly distributed according to social justice. Such new models of technological change
could only become convincing in a new context after the long 1960s, in which choice, in
diﬀerent forms, became highly valorized.
So, ﬁnally, what role does Ellul assign to science? The answer is simple: ‘science has
become an instrument of technique’. ‘Science is becoming more and more subordinate
to the search for technical application. ’85 Like all other human aﬀairs, science had been
assimilated, an ‘enslavement’ that only became entrenched in the twentieth century.86
When Ellul called for ‘all of us’ to seek by ‘acts of freedom’ ways of transcending
technique, then he must also have been asking either for science’s emancipation or for
science, too, to be rejected in the name of a greater salvation.
The call to self-analysis and to ‘transcend’ the system was also the rousing conclusion
to Marshall Berman’s historical examination of radical individualism and the emerg-
ence of modern society, The Politics of Authenticity (1971). Berman, a Harvard post-
graduate during the years of protest, concludes,
The system builds and programs everyone to order. Hence only an ‘underclass ’ which is
totally ‘outside’ the system can even understand it, let alone work to change it. The chances
that such an underclass will form are very dim; even if it should form, the chances are that
it will be co-opted [recall Ellul] … Hence the self can preserve itself only by totally dropping
out – by withdrawing into the woods, or into madness, or into both – by living secret lives
and creating invisible communities underground. Montesquieu and Rousseau suggest that
even in a thoroughly repressive society, there may be alternatives to the polarities of total
revolution or total retreat. They argue that even though everyone is indeed conditioned by an
alienated social system, this conditioning may include a capacity to criticize and transcend the
system.87
Berman had retreated two centuries and in the end described himself. The ‘modern
society ’ whose emergence he traced was the society around him. Furthermore, what he
found through Rousseau and Montesquieu was an instruction to analyse oneself : ‘ the
very powers which enable us to see through others can enable us to see through our-
selves ’.
84 This case for the inﬂuence of personalism in the long 1960s is advanced in J. J. Farrell, The Spirit of the
Sixties: Making Postwar Radicalism, London, 1997.
85 Ellul, op. cit. (78), 10, 312.
86 Ellul, op. cit. (78), 45.
87 M. Berman, The Politics of Authenticity: Radical Individualism and the Emergence of Modern Society,
London, 1971, 323. Berman’s emphasis, but, again, the emphasis works here too.
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This self-analysis mattered for science. Like Berman, Theodore Roszak spun ob-
servations of his contemporary, largely academic society into a call for a counter-
cultural vanguard. In The Making of the Counter Culture (1968) Roszak suggested that
objectivity itself was mythological. This mattered, in his analysis, because the tech-
nocracy depended on experts who justiﬁed their role as being purveyors of reliable
knowledge, while ‘reliable knowledge’ was knowledge that was ‘scientiﬁcally sound’
and science was characterized by ‘objectivity’. Working back up the chain of reasoning,
deny objectivity and you deny technocracy at its source.88 Roszak’s argument against
objectivity was suggestive rather than compelling. From Kuhn he borrowed his scepti-
cism about seeing the history of science as the incremental accumulation of true
knowledge. He referred the reader to Michael Polanyi for the full challenge to objec-
tivity. We are less concerned with where Roszak hoped the world was going, than with
what he said of the source of critique:
In the case of the counter culture, then, we have a movement which has turned from objective
consciousness as if from a place inhabited by plague – and in the moment of that turning, one
can just begin to see an entire episode in our cultural history, the great age of science and
technology which began in the Enlightenment, standing revealed in all its quaint arbitrary,
often absurd, and all too unbalanced aspects.89
The revolution he claimed to identify was one of consciousness, for it was ‘the psy-
chology and not the epistemology of science that urgently requires our critical atten-
tion’.90 He illustrated the ‘objective consciousness ’ with a horror-show of an appendix.
The counter-culture was equipped for the role of critic of the objective consciousness
because, despite its diversity, both its main currents, the New Left activists and the
‘mind-blown bohemianism of the beats and hippies’, shared an ‘extraordinary per-
sonalism’, a ‘consciousness consciousness ’ that emphasized a politics of self-examin-
ation.91
So in Roszak’s analysis the contribution of the New Left to the change of attitudes to
science and technology was indirect.92 An infantilized generation, made conscious of
itself through market eﬀects and expanded higher education, developed a politics of
personalism that, by chance, would allow it eﬀectively to oppose the greater evil of
science-based technocracy. Roszak found the New Left’s personalism best expressed in
the SDS Port Huron Statement of 1962 that opposed ‘the depersonalisation that reduces
human beings to the status of things’, an alienation that ‘cannot be overcome by better
personnel management nor by improved gadgets but only when a love of man over-
comes the idolatrous worship of things by man’. Roszak reckoned this personalism
implied a devaluation of authority and hierarchy. He approvingly quoted Kenneth
88 Roszak, op. cit. (33), 208.
89 Roszak, op. cit. (33), 215.
90 Roszak, op. cit. (33), 217. What sorts of psychology is unclear. Perhaps something like C. T. Tort,
‘States of consciousness and state-speciﬁc sciences’, Science (1972), 176, 1203–10.
91 Roszak, op. cit. (33), 56, 62.
92 Rose and Rose note how unconcerned with science were key authors of the British New Left such as
Raymond Williams and Perry Anderson: H. Rose and S. Rose, The Radicalisation of Science, London, 1976,
13.
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Keniston of the Yale Medical School: ‘ in manner and style, these young radicals are
extremely ‘‘personalistic ’’, focussed on face-to-face, direct and open relationships with
other people; hostile to formally structured roles and traditional bureaucratic patterns
of power and authority’, a characteristic Keniston traces to the child-rearing habits of
the contemporary middle-class family’.93 What was new in Roszak’s argument was the
identiﬁcation of the counter-culture as vanguard and of science as its legitimate target.
Crucially, for Roszak, the 1960s self was produced as autonomous and self-examining,
perhaps also self-absorbed and self-interested. In generational terms, the eﬀects of the
market and higher education intensiﬁed the 1960s generation’s consciousness of itself.94
Calls for self-management, notes Feenberg, were also a prominent feature of the events
of Paris in 1968.95
As practised in new ways in the long 1960s, the sociology of scientiﬁc knowledge was
another, most profound, expression of such self-analysis. The new sociology of science
argued that science’s content was open to sociological investigation. In the form of
Bloor’s strong programme, the explicit intention was to turn the methods of science on
science itself. Yet when Frances Yates contrasted Giordano Bruno’s underground arts
of memory with the hierarchical methods of scholasticism, the society described was
interpreted by readers as a long-1960s self-description, just as was the work of
Berman.96 Likewise, Commoner’s campaigns were projects orchestrated so that scien-
tists were organizing critically to observe science. Jerry Ravetz nailed this moment:
industrialized science was provoking its ‘opposite, ‘‘critical science’’ ’, a ‘self-conscious
and coherent force’.97 Finally, the new breed of science journalists, notably Greenberg,
helped others to analyse science scientiﬁcally. Steven Shapin recalls reading Greenberg,
worrying about Vietnam and being moved to the place, intellectually, where the strong
programme started.98
Many commentators have observed that the new sociology of science emerged in the
context of Wave Two, the social movements. Thus far the debate on this emergence has
been limited to deﬁnition of precisely which social movement was most productive. For
example, Haraway favours new environmentalism and feminism while Feenberg
stresses the New Left and the Paris events.99 Other sources provide further examples.
Moore pinpoints sources of the critique in which it is claimed interests shaped content
as the publication of How Harvard Rules Women (1970) and in the arguments of
Commoner’s protean Greater St Louis Committee for Nuclear Intelligence against
93 Roszak, op. cit. (33), 60.
94 Roszak, op. cit. (33), 27.
95 ‘Self-management, one of the goals of this revolution.’ Feenberg, op. cit. (51), 39.
96 F. A. Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition, Chicago, 1964; idem, The Art of Memory,
Chicago, 1966.
97 J. R. Ravetz, Scientiﬁc Knowledge and Its Social Problems, Oxford, 1971, 10, 423, 424. My emphasis.
98 Read the fascinating but brief biographical sketch in Shapin’s introductory essay to D. S. Greenberg,
The Politics of Pure Science, 2nd edn, Chicago, 1999.
99 ‘Donna Haraway argues that the emergence of new approaches owes much to the environmental and
feminist movements, and, I would add the contributions of thinkers such as Marcuse and Foucault … It is
ironic that the currently dominant social theory of technology seems to have no grasp of the political condi-
tions of its own credibility’. Feenberg, op. cit. (51), 12.
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Edward Teller.100 Similarly, Nelkin’s The University and Military Research (1971) both
was clearly personal and emerged from the activism of the 1969 MIT Science Action
Coordinating Committee. Likewise, MIT’s Science and Public Policy programme
produced Anne Hessing Cahn’s Eggheads and Warheads: Scientists and the ABM
(1971).
Likewise, we need to historicize the new sociology of technology. Feenberg ﬁnds that
the ‘movements of the 1960s created a context and an audience for the break with
technocratic determinism that had already begun in the theoretical domain in the works
of Mumford and a few other skeptical observers of the postwar scene’ and that it was
‘ in this context that an American school of philosophy of technology emerged’ (ex-
empliﬁed by Winner, Borgmann and Ihde).101 Feenberg also notes that it is ‘ ironic ’ that
the new sociology of technology has forgotten the politics of its birth. One could,
contentiously, suggest that the sociology of technology of the beginning of the long
1960s, typiﬁed by Ellul, most starkly diﬀered from the sociology of technology emerg-
ing at its end, notably the beginnings of the approach known as SCOT, in its account of
the roles available to groups and even individuals as choosers. Technological choice
became valorized.102 Technological logics, paths, trajectories, indeed anything strongly
constrained or at limit determined, came to be ridiculed. Is it a coincidence that the
same period saw the political celebration of consumer choice, when Hayek’s
Individualism and Economic Order was read over Keynes?
In his review of James Watson’s autobiographical account of the determination of the
structure of DNA, The Double Helix (1968), the biochemist Erwin Chargaﬀ made the
pregnant remark that it is
perhaps not realized generally to what extent the ‘heroes’ of Watson’s book represent a
new kind of scientist, and one that could hardly have been thought of before science became a
mass occupation, subject to, and forming part of, all the vulgarities of the communications
media.103
We should take seriously Chargaﬀ’s notice of a ‘new kind of scientist ’. Many com-
mentators noted that Watson’s protagonists behaved like ordinary human beings rather
than following some higher moral code that regulated scientists. But this was not what
Chargaﬀ meant. There are two separate questions: was Watson merely describing how
scientists behaved ‘in real life ’ for the ﬁrst time? If so, what had changed about the
world so that Watson, in 1968, was able to be the ﬁrst do this? The Double Helix
cannot be read simply as an account of what ‘really ’ happened. As Jacob Bronowski
was quick to observe, the structure of the narrative resembles a fairy tale. Second, if
there was something new about how scientists behaved, what was it and why had it
appeared in the post-war period? As Edward Yoxen has pointed out, one context was
100 Moore, op. cit. (45), 1615–16.
101 Feenberg, op. cit. (51), 6.
102 Note that the processes whereby actors could highlight or downplay the roles of choice were complex
and need tracing in detail. Feenberg has given one case study in Commoner vs Ehrlich on population growth.
103 E. Chargaﬀ, ‘A quick climb up Mount Olympus’ (review of The Double Helix), Science (1968), 159,
1448–9.
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the ﬁght for disciplinary recognition and power for emergent molecular biology. The
author ofWhat Is Life?, Erwin Schro¨dinger was one scientist enrolled as an ancestor to
give 1960s molecular biology some genealogical substance.104 Likewise, Watson’s por-
trayal of his and Crick’s lifestyle was an invitation to recruits.
But the invention of ‘heroes’ invites the question of what exactly was being cham-
pioned. Watson’s protagonists were individualistic, entrepreneurial and willing to bend
rules and slight colleagues to get ahead. They are a good illustration of what, counter-
intuitively, links Waves Two and Three. Marwick observed that individual cultural
entrepreneurship was an underappreciated feature of the long 1960s. Such en-
trepreneurialism explains why new social movements, especially the counter-culture,
took the forms they did. Watson’s protagonists are from the same mould. (So are the
protagonists of the anti-IBM homebrew computer movements of the early and mid-
1970s, notably the Apple founders. The similarity is no coincidence.105) The exponent of
privately funded biotechnology Craig Venter was in California in his early twenties
when he read The Double Helix. A recent hagiographical sketch signiﬁcantly informs
us, ‘Years later Venter would complain that he had no mentors … If there was one, he
said, it was the Watson of The Double Helix.106 The point is not that the Watson
persona stands in contrast to that of the cultural movers in the long 1960s. Rather, in
‘doing his own thing’, he is self-ishly similar.
Perhaps the long 1960s were more accurately typiﬁed by the coexistence and con-
tradiction between such individualistic entrepreneurship and communal ideals.107
Indeed, such a tension is precisely what can be seen in the various ﬁrst-hand narratives
of the DNA story. Watson gives us the individualist–entrepreneur. Maurice Wilkins’s
The Third Man of the Double Helix (2003) has belatedly reminded us of the communal
ideal.108 The communal model is old, and was captured if not frozen in its Cold War
form in Merton’s CUDOS norms. Just as the Balogh dynamic describes a thaw from
ﬁxed private expert–expert relations to experts set against each other in public, so the
melting of Merton’s norms released a tide of individualism and entrepreneurialism
within the sciences. Watson provides just the models of behaviour, the ‘heroes’,
necessary for 1970s commercialization in the biosciences. Wave Three provides the link
between the long 1960s and the DNA story and the entrepreneurial professors described
by Kenney.109
104 E. J. Yoxen, ‘Where does Schro¨dinger’s What Is Life? belong in the history of molecular biology?’,
History of Science (1979), 17, 17–52.
105 J. Markoﬀ,What the Dormouse Said: How the Sixties Counterculture Shaped the Personal Computer
Industry, New York, 2005; F. Turner, From Counterculture to Cyberculture: Stewart Brand, theWhole Earth
Network, and the Rise of Digital Utopianism, Chicago, 2006.
106 T. Anton, Bold Science: Seven Scientists Who Are Changing Our World, New York, 2000, 11. I use
‘hagiography’ in its true sense: Anton presents us with ideally good lives.
107 Brick, op. cit. (2), makes contradiction the unifying theme for understanding the long 1960s.
108 M.Wilkins, The ThirdMan of the Double Helix, Oxford, 2003. Good X-ray pictures were the result of
‘The great community spirit and co-operation in our lab ’ (123–4). And elsewhere: ‘Francis and Jim asked me
whether I would mind if they started building models again. I found this question horrible. I did not like
treating science as a race, and I especially did not like the idea of them racing against me. I was strongly
attached to the idea of the scientiﬁc community ’ (205). My emphases.
109 Kenney, op. cit. (21).
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What do we do with Chargaﬀ’s substantive claim that the ‘new kind of scientist ’ was
a product of the development of science as a mass occupation? Watson’s protagonists
were useful ﬁctions, useful in providing a semblance of individualism in a far less in-
dividualistic pursuit. Science was fully a part of what Brick labels the ‘socialization of
intellect in the new mass universities ’ and Watson’s individualistic self-portrait emerges
as a means of resolving tensions.110 Another approach would be to do as Chargaﬀ
suggests, to relate the processes of individualization and entrepreneurialism to devel-
opments in mass media. At least one highly popular if problematic sociological attempt
to explain why Americans became more individualistic in the post-war period does
precisely that: the reason why Americans bowl alone, says Robert Putnam, was tele-
vision.111
Return to Friends House
We should not regard the new sociology of science as entirely a creature of Wave Two
or treat it as the product of one social movement rather than another. Instead, we
should recognize science studies as the result of an interference between Waves One,
Two and Three. Wave One produced experts and created moments where divergent
expert views were publicly accessible. As Commoner observed, if faced with two con-
tradictory expert statements there is an alternative to the assumption that one expert is
telling the truth and the other is not. One can instead question what both experts have
in common, a claim on truth. What happened next can be seen as another link in a
Wave One chain reaction, an institutional context that created a demand for further
experts: this time, experts on expertise. Wave Two provided the institutional vehicles
that could carry scrutiny. The BSSRS, the Social Impact of Modern Biology conference
and the edited proceedings were all examples of Wave Two phenomena that orche-
strated and supported such an inquiry. Finally, Wave Three directed this inquiry in-
wards. The geneticist Jon Beckwith had ﬂown from Berkeley, home of Roszak’s
‘consciousness consciousness ’, to provide testimony on the ‘scientist in opposition in
the United States ’.112 Citing the Nature editorial of 27 December 1969, Beckwith noted
that (as we might now expect from Wave One) it was publicly visible expert conﬂict
that created intense establishment discomfort :
The reactions to our statements were strong and bitter from some quarters. There was an
outcry from many scientists against publicizing any negative aspects of our work. They felt
that the problems and control of science were better handled quietly by leaders of the scientiﬁc
community.
110 Brick, op. cit. (2), 16.
111 I am only being superﬁcially simplistic. A close analysis of the structure of Putnam’s argument shows
that he argues that the eﬀects of television were pivotal: R. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival
of American Community, New York, 2000.
112 J. Beckwith, ‘The scientist in opposition in the United States’, in Fuller, op. cit. (10), 225–31.
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In consequence, Beckwith argued that in
the same way that radical historians or economists expose the way in which most history or
economics is taught from a political viewpoint supportive of the system, the radical scientist
must expose the way in which science … is politically organised and directed.113
The inner workings of science must be revealed. Wave Three was also evident, as we
will now show, in the astounding speeches by Bronowski and Young.
The key presentation by the establishment scientists was Jacob Bronowski’s proposal
for the ‘disestablishment of science’. Director of the Council of Biology in Human
Aﬀairs at the Salk Institute and at that moment planning and shooting footage for the
celebrated documentary series The Ascent of Man, Bronowski began by labelling calls
for ‘a moratorium on science’ as the ‘favoured daydream of the bewildered citizen’.
But behind this dream was something more profound, recognition of the importance of
‘a voluntary agreement among scientists themselves’ : ‘ If science is to express a con-
science ’, argued Bronowski, it must be self-generated, ‘ it must come spontaneously out
of the community of scientists ’. In particular, scientists were ‘face to face with a choice
of conscience between two moralities : the moralities of science, and the morality of
national and government power’. These moralities, stated Bronowski, were ‘not com-
patible’. Government patronage of the sciences led to ‘moral distortion, a readiness to
use any means for its own ends’ :
The scientist who goes into this jungle of 20th-century government, anywhere in the world,
puts himself at a double disadvantage. In the ﬁrst place, he does not make policy; he does not
even help to make it, and most of the time he has no idea what shifts of policy his advice is
meant to serve. And in the second and, oddly, the more serious place (for him) he has no
control over the way in which what he says in council will be presented to the public. I call this
more serious for him, because public respect for science is built on his intellectual integrity,
and the second-hand statements and the garbled extracts that are attributed to him bring him
into disrepute.
Experts disagreed with experts in public, said Bronowski, because of misrepresentation
by and of government bodies. He oﬀered his solution: ‘The time has come to consider
how we might bring about a separation, as complete as possible, between science and
government in all countries. I call this the disestablishment of science. ’ By rolling back
the state in science in the name of restoring the autonomy, the self-determination, of
science, Bronowski’s programme would deliver science to private interests. His argu-
ment is a clear example of how sea-change rhetoric could prepare the ground for the
commercialization of the life sciences in the 1970s. Notice the grounds of the argument
in the Wave One problem of public statements by experts bringing scientists ‘ into
disrepute’.114 Furthermore, the resources necessary for Bronowski to make this argu-
ment came from Wave Two in the BSSRS as organizers and audience. Bronowski’s
Council for Biology in Human Aﬀairs at the Salk Institute had stumped up the cash for
the conference. He had paid his way in. Notice, too, the ﬂurry of Wave Three notions
113 Beckwith, op. cit. (112), 226–7, 228.
114 J. Bronowski, ‘The disestablishment of science’, in Fuller, op. cit. (10), 233–43, 233, 234, 238, 239,
241.
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such as self-analysis, self-determination and autonomy. Bronowski’s argument ﬁnds
echoes in one recent, sophisticated study of science as an ideological and political re-
source. Ezrahi has claimed that a disestablishment of science did indeed take place in
the long 1960s and that a wave of reﬂexivity acted to decouple political action from
science as an exemplar of rationality in liberal democracies.115 Thus the Ascent of Man
connects to the Descent of Icarus.
Bronowski infuriated the radicals on the conference ﬂoor. ‘ I think we’ve just heard a
prize example of liberal clap-trap’, said one. Rosenhead turned Bronowski’s arguments
around: it was not individual integrity that was at issue but the irresponsibility of
institutions. Radicals and establishment scientists heard and praised diﬀerent aspects of
the conference. Bronowski’s talk may have been the one that the ‘national press ’ chose
to ‘headline’, noted an editorial in the BSSRS Newssheet in early 1971, but the most
‘eagerly-awaited’ was the paper by a historian of science, Robert M. Young.116 It was
also by far the most divisive.117 In ‘Evolutionary biology and ideology: then and now,
Young started from the same observation as Monod, Wilkins and Bohm: ‘We are
struggling to integrate science and values’ but ‘at the same time we are prevented from
doing so by our most basic assumptions’. There followed a masterclass in the new
sociology of science: facts are theory-laden, concepts are value-laden, ‘knowledge is
both a product of social change and a major factor in social change and/or the oppo-
sition to it ’. ‘This ’, noted Young, was a ‘commonplace’ (for some), ‘but its systematic
application has radical consequences for the idea of ‘‘objective’’ science’. A sharp
analysis of three case studies followed. The essential point, though, was that
no one can conﬁdently draw the line between fact, interpretation, hypothesis, and speculation
(which may itself be fruitful). It seems to me that it is the social responsibility of science to
enter wholeheartedly into this debate and directly answer such works in the non-specialist
press. Paradoxically, we must relax the authority of science and see it in an ideological per-
spective in order to get nearer the will-o’-the-wisp of objectivity. We have won a Pyrrhic
victory in establishing the part-reality and part-myth of the autonomy and objectivity of sci-
ence, and the existence of this Society and its conﬂicting aims reﬂects our unsteady position. In
one sense science should feel strong enough to stop ﬂailing horses which died in the nineteenth
century in their attempts to protect the status and methods of science. But in an other sense, we
need – for our own moral purposes – to think seriously about the metaphysics of science,
about the philosophy of nature, of man and of society, and especially about the ideological
assumptions which underlie, constrain and are fed by science.118
115 Y. Ezrahi, The Descent of Icarus: Science and the Transformation of Contemporary Democracy,
Cambridge, MA, 1990.
116 BSSRS Newsheet, 1971, 10. The Newssheet was turned later into the journal Science for People. For
comment on Science for People and Undercurrents see J. R. Ravetz, ‘Anti-establishment science in some
British journals’, in Counter-movements in the Sciences (ed. H. Nowotny and H. Rose), Sociology of the
Sciences (1979) 3, 27–37.
117 Jon Beckwith’s paper pleased the radicals most, being reportage and reﬂections on the Berkeley ex-
perience. The Roses, too, drew on Kuhn, Marcuse and the Wave Two movements to demolish the ‘myth of
neutrality of science’. But it was Young’s paper which electriﬁed the conference. S. Rose and H. Rose, ‘The
myth of the neutrality of science’, in Fuller, op. cit. (10), 215–24. Beckwith, op. cit. (112). See also J. Beckwith,
Making Genes, Making Waves: A Social Activist in Science, Cambridge, MA, 2002.
118 R. M. Young, ‘Evolutionary biology and ideology: then and now’, in Fuller, op. cit. (10), 199–213,
201, 203, 211.
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The programme for the new sociology of science was here mapped out. Furthermore, as
Young notices, the diversity of accounts of what was happening with science in the long
1960s, as exempliﬁed by the BSSRS (‘the existence of this Society and its conﬂicting
aims reﬂects our unsteady position’), was what prompted the turn inwards to ask for a
sociology of scientiﬁc content. In a powerful sense, then, sociology of scientiﬁc
knowledge was self-description. This is a line of inquiry that has already begun.
Schaﬀer, for example, has suggested that Kuhn’s Structure can also be seen as a de-
scription of his immediate intellectual context.119 We may also recall that ‘crisis talk’
was a feature both of the subject of Paul Forman’s path-breaking study of Weimar
physics and of the context of science studies in the long 1960s.120 We must understand
Wave Three in order to historicize SSK and vice versa.
Conclusion
There are powerful reasons for not making a fuss about the transition from the sixties to the
seventies a few days from now. For one thing, time is known to be continuous. For another,
attempts artiﬁcially to separate one interval from another usually stimulate exaggeration or
oversimpliﬁcation … The truth is that there have emerged in public opinion of science and
technology a group of interlocking heresies … 121
Editorial, ‘On which side are the angels?’, Nature (1969), 224, 1241–2
In the closing days of the 1960s, the editors of Nature chose to attack a fearful array of
‘ interlocking heresies ’, prominent among them the ‘pollution movement ’, the
‘Doomsday Fallacy’ and any linkage of ‘fears about genetic engineering with the
widespread anxiety about the war in Vietnam’. ‘Why’, they plaintively asked, ‘ is there
such currency in these fantasies?’ As it happens, a particular fantasy they hoped to ‘give
the lie to’ was global warming through the greenhouse eﬀect. What made matters much
worse, in the editors’ eyes, was that this critique was self-generated and self-sustained:
the ‘fact that many professional scientists have recently been contributing to this mis-
guided assessment of the risks of modern life is reprehensible’.
TheNature editors knew something was happening but did not in truth know what it
was. Their rivals over at Science also ran editorials that consoled the journal’s readers
that any supposed ‘crisis in conﬁdence in science’ might be just a matter of ‘ambiv-
alence, not rejection’, while doubting both the data and the phenomenon.122 Are we in a
better position to know what happened about science in the long 1960s? What can we
say that avoids exaggeration and oversimpliﬁcation?
This paper has oﬀered a three-wave model which together captures something of the
long 1960s as a period of ‘sea change’. While I have taken as a case study a handful of
papers from just one conference, evidence for the three waves is drawn from a diverse
119 S. Schaﬀer, paper for STS Workshop, Cambridge HPS, 2 March 2006.
120 P. Forman, ‘Weimar culture, causality and quantum theory, 1918–1927’, Historical Studies in the
Physical Sciences (1971), 3, 1–115.
121 This editorial was a direct response to a letter published in the same issue from Jim Shapiro, Larry Eron
and Jon Beckwith.
122 Etzioni and Nunn, op. cit. (19); Nunn, op. cit. (26).
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secondary literature that had not hitherto been fully brought together. Wave One de-
scribed an institutional dynamic that drew out experts from closed and hidden dis-
agreement into situations where expert disagreement was open to public scrutiny. This
‘Balogh model ’ also accounted for the multiplication of experts. Wave Two consisted
of institutions and audiences that could carry public scrutiny and provide a home for
sea-change cultures. In particular, Wave Two could provide stage, audience and theatre
directors for the play of disagreeing experts. The writings of activist–scientists and new
critical journalism also helped. A necessary condition for public ‘ambivalence’ about
science was that both sides were publicly presented. Wave Three was marked by an
orientation towards the self, in diverse ways. Acknowledgement of this self-regard re-
solves some paradoxical features of this topic. For example, many commentators
identiﬁed changing attitudes towards science with the ‘young’, while polling data
suggested that ‘young people’ were ‘not the main source of lack of conﬁdence’.123 But
there is little doubt that the baby-boom generation were more reﬂexive, more likely to
examine themselves, their cohort, their society, and therefore more likely to articulate
and consume self-analysis, even if they were not on average more critical.
All three waves need to be framed in the Cold War context. The polarized geopol-
itical world provided a common container for all sea-change phenomena. The Cold
War provided the freeze that formed a common origin for the Balogh-style chain re-
actions. The inﬂuence of the Cold War on social movements went far beyond the ob-
vious provision of targets, such as nuclear weapons and the Vietnam War, against
which to organize. Cold War culture and institutions, such as containment, consensus,
conformity, extraordinary arsenals of science-based technological systems, and hier-
archies of systems were, in a powerful sense, the ocean on which the three waves
moved. More speciﬁcally, the Cold War shaped the sea change by encouraging the
development of techniques that, when turned inwards, became instruments of critique.
Sometimes this critique was played out within the sciences, as when Cold War
oceanographic data provided ammunition for the plate tectonics revolution.124
Sometimes the critique was played out on a more traditionally political stage.
Cybernetics, for example, contributed its core techniques, the analysis of feedback
loops, to the models used by the Club of Rome to identify the limits to growth. James
Lovelock built his technical authority on the development of ionization detectors
for gas chromatography, which attracted patronage from NASA, before he spent
this intellectual capital on promulgating Gaia. The Cold War provided the new
environmentalism with critical tools. Even as simple a move as the invention of a new
self-critical term, ‘big science ’, partly originated in the reﬂections of Alvin Weinberg,
an administrator of a central laboratory of the Cold War, Oak Ridge, as well as in
Derek de Solla Price’s science of science.125 Or, shifting ﬁelds again, RAND techniques
for assessing the management of research and development contributed to a critique of
123 Etzioni and Nunn, op. cit. (19); original emphasis. The older, the less educated, and, in the United
States, the further south you were, the less conﬁdence in science you had.
124 Brick, op. cit. (2), 9.
125 J. H. Capshew and K. A. Rader, ‘Big science: Price to the present’, Osiris (1992) 7, 3–25; P. Galison
and B. Hevly (eds.), Big Science: The Growth of Large-Scale Research, Stanford, 1992.
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top-down hierarchical centralized authority.126 Radical variants of technocratic tools
were proposed.127
Hollinger’s explanation for the ‘ little renaissance of ‘‘science studies ’’ ’ of 1962 to
1965 is a special case of this general argument.128 Hollinger notes the remarkable
ﬂourishing of communitarian language about science found in the work of, amongst
others, Don K. Price, Warren O. Hagstrom and, pre-eminently, Thomas Kuhn’s
Structure. Scientiﬁc communities were, of course, not new. But the emphasis on
‘scientiﬁc community’ as a representation of science, replacing older individualist
images, was innovative. The switch in representations, argues Hollinger, happened
because of the ‘revolutionizing of the political economy of physical science’. The rise of
big science conﬁrmed in the Cold War encouraged talk of ‘scientiﬁc community’ not
because science was more communal but because its precarious autonomy could better
be defended. Hence emerged what Hollinger calls ‘ laissez-faire communitarianism’:
science is a self-managing community, so let it be. Likewise, Brick argues that the
condition of the socialization of the intellect, the organization of intellectual life in
formal institutions relying on public funds and engaged with public policy formation,
provoked questions about the consequences of socialization for knowledge.129 But if
science were a community then did it not therefore have communal responsibilities?
This was precisely the line of thinking that led to bodies such as the BSSRS.
Critical voices were therefore partly generated from within the Cold War establish-
ment, a feature noticed by several of the commentators previously discussed such as
Jacob Bronowski, the Nature editors and Maurice Wilkins. In his review of the rela-
tions of science, social movements and the long 1960s, Mendelsohn has also empha-
sized the stranger linkages and sympathies that made and crossed the oppositional
culture. Thus Lewis Mumford’s despairing The Pentagon of Power (1970) found critics
in conservative historians such as Gerald Holton, and is contrasted to the upbeat op-
timistic portrayal of technology in Harvard’s Technology and Society programme,
funded by IBM to the tune of one million dollars. But Mumford’s jeremiad shared
concerns with Eisenhower’s military–industrial complex speech, the president’s fare-
well address to the nation of January 1961, which in turn echoed C. Wright Mills’s
arguments in the Power Elite (1956), hardly a political bedfellow of Eisenhower.130
Critical science exemplars were Commoner’s St Louis group and the societies for social
responsibility in science. As previously shown, Commoner’s Science and Survival
126 D. Hounshell, ‘The Cold War, RAND, and the generation of knowledge, 1946–1962’, Historical
Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences (1997), 27, 237–67, 257.
127 Including a ‘Guerrilla’ and ‘alternative Operational Reseach’: ‘ the current techniques of OR can be
turned to the use of sections of the community threatened by the OR currently used by the dominant
forces … One can speculate on the development of an OR that doesn’t view people in a quantiﬁable ab-
stracted form’. C. Thunhurst, ‘Radical OR?’, Science for People (1974), 25, 10–11. An Institute of Critical
Operational Research was planned – and a journal, OR?gasm.
128 Hollinger, op. cit. (8), 99–110.
129 Brick, op. cit. (2), 23.
130 Mendelsohn notes the immediate, local context of Eisenhower’s speech: Eisenhower had been hoping
for a nuclear test-ban treaty but had been thwarted by manoeuvres by ‘newly powerful scientists (Edward
Teller is the obvious ﬁgure) … aided by friends in the military’. Mendelsohn, op. cit. (1), 156.
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(1966) was self-directed in the sense that it recognized the need for a study of the study
of science in the outcome of Balogh-type processes : experts publicly disagreeing with
experts. Ravetz’s ‘self-conscious’ ‘critical science’ is also a good illustration of how
Wave Three concerns were produced by Wave Two interactions.
For the generation growing up in the 1960s, the images of science were ‘contradic-
tory’. The generation were free to enjoy beneﬁts (domestic technologies, ‘high-tech
music ’, synthetic drugs) while consuming critical texts (Kuhn, Feyerabend, Carson,
Ehrlich, Commoner, Illich, Schumacher) and recognizing the ‘ loss of innocence’ of
science made vivid by anti-nuclear and anti-Vietnam movements. Howard Brick has
emphasized how contradiction was a feature of much of what was distinctive about the
long 1960s. Likewise, the notion of a sea change formed by the interference of three
waves captures the otherwise contradictory aspects of the long 1960s identiﬁed by
Mendelsohn and Ravetz: short-term turmoil, a feeling of profound movement, a sense
of failure.131 ‘The sixties’ may have been a short-lived phenomenon,132 but the waves
that interfered to produce them cannot be conﬁned to one place or one time.
For us the outcome of the interference of Waves One, Two and Three in a self-
conscious study of science (to which we have given many names) is the closest to home.
Participants at the time noticed that analyses of science had passed from use–abuse
models, in which a ‘good science ’ was distinguished and preserved from a ‘bad sci-
ence’, to models of how the content of scientiﬁc knowledge, good, bad or otherwise,
was related to context. In the interference betweenWave Two andWave Three we have
an explanation of this passage. As Moore has shown us, Wave Two encouraged the
formation of separate bodies to preserve the purity of bodies of the scientiﬁc estab-
lishment. In Wave Three the institutional pressures to preserve purity of the kind that
Moore has pinpointed were overcome. It became possible to talk beyond the use–abuse
model. A science of science was encouraged. Self-analysis moved to consider the con-
tent of science. In the case of the Social Impact of Modern Biology conference, a speech
such as Young’s was articulable.
There are other ways of historicizing the emergence of a new study of science.
Jamison and Eyerman stress continuity between the 1930s and long-1960s radical cri-
tiques, a continuity dependent on a fragile chain of torch-bearers: C. Wright Mills,
Hannah Arendt, Erich Fromm, Fairﬁeld Osborn, Lewis Mumford, Rachel Carson and
Leo Szilard.133 Likewise, Steven and Hilary Rose charge that the radical idea that the
content of science might be social in character had been suppressed by the mobilization
for war.134 The reactions to the Bomb and to Lysenkoism had encouraged an ideology
131 Both Mendelsohn and Ravetz tot up a record of some successes (environmental regulation, women’s
‘self-health’ movements, alternative medicines) but more failures (the withering of the societies for social
responsibility in science, alternative technology).
132 Indeed, the Smithsonian Institution housed a Center for Short-lived Phenomena – a Wave Three enti-
ty – which collected and compared data on short-lived phenomena (earthquakes, oil spills, sudden declines in
puﬃn populations, infestations of vermin). It produced a few permanent records, such as The Pulse of the
Planet (1972), before disappearing. The Center for Short-lived Phenomena was itself a short-lived phenom-
enon.
133 Jamison and Eyerman, op. cit. (48).
134 Rose and Rose, op. cit. (92).
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of science as neutral. Only with the thawing of this mid-century freeze, glossed as a
loosening of the ties that bound science to the state, could an alternative ideology
emerge. (Notice the parallel withWave One.) Such accounts frame the long 1960s as the
return of submerged 1930s attitudes.
Another interpretation of the sea change would see it as a transition from a pre-
ference for pyramidal models of organization to network models, from centralized
command to distributed agency without ‘exaggeration and over-simpliﬁcation’. We are
faced with partial accounts with enough similarities to suggest the need for a general,
synthetic history. The available robust accounts appeal to speciﬁc causes such as the
transition from centralized hierarchies to dispersed networks in social structures,
architecture, computer technology and defence organization;135 the fall from favour of
the large centralized ﬁrm in favour of the ﬂexible network of ﬁrms;136 the challenge to
doctors’ authority from ‘self-help’ social movements;137 the retreat of government from
the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy; and the expansion of the market.138 For any
‘node’ – whether a self-treating patient, a node in the ARPANET, a ﬁrm responding
ﬂexibly or a consumer – to act autonomously was also to self-analyse and self-direct.
Many of these phenomena were crises in some form of reproduction, not only as re-
production of a generation, workforce or university-educated cadre, but also repro-
ductive crises in the sense that the debate over the Pill marked a reproductive crisis.139
Just as autopoiesis was being named as a scientiﬁc subject, the re-creation of the self
seemed problematic. My hypothesis is that these processes all share the features of
Wave Three.
Wave Three is the least clearly delineated by historians and also the one that
strikes closest to home for sociologists of science and technology and for the historians
of science alongside whom they have worked. Waves One, Two and particularly
Three opened an intellectual space for the sociology of scientiﬁc knowledge. The
identiﬁcation of Wave Three immediately opens up a series of historical research topics
that can now be seen as part of a wider whole. How can the changing sciences of
selfhood – such as immunology, genetics as informed by triumphant molecular biology,
or psychology – be understood as part of these broader changes? In computing and in
135 Note Talcott Parsons’s observations on the creation of ‘networks of solidarity on much more highly
universalistic bases than kinship’ discussed in Brick, op. cit. (2), 118. P. Galison, ‘War against the center’,
Grey Room (2001), 4, 5–33.
136 Cf. M. J. Piore and C. F. Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity, New York,
1984.
137 Cf. S. B. Ruzek, The Women’s Health Movement: Feminist Alternatives to Medical Control, New
York, 1978.
138 The term is, of course, Lenin’s but was recalled recently in D. Yergin and J. Stanislaw, The
Commanding Heights: The Battle between Government and the Marketplace that Is Remaking the Modern
World, New York, 1998, unsatisfying because it presents a Keynesian history of the transition from Keynes to
Hayek (a few wise heads belatedly chose Hayek), whereas what is needed is a truly Hayekian history of the
transition from Keynes to Hayek (that is to say, history which is the product of many, in which the wise
choices of the few do not guide history).
139 Furthermore, they were crises in reproduction of forms, such as the hierarchical corporation, or the
modern university, that stabilized in the late nineteenth century. The long 1960s, of course, have also been
seen as a crisis in Enlightenment forms.
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governance, the long 1960s saw a convulsive and otherwise puzzling debate over priv-
acy. Does this debate now make sense when set in a broader context? In religion, in
some but not all countries, the long 1960s were the period of dechristianization.140 This
is often glossed, inWave Two-type analyses, as part of wider patterns of opposition and
distrust of authority. But what should we make of the parallels with science?
Quantitative evidence reported by Science, for example, held that the ‘falling away
from science’ was ‘part of a general lessening of faith in American institutions and
authorities rather than a major anti-science groundswell … from religion to the mili-
tary, from the press to major US companies [a]ppreciation for all of them, without
exception, has fallen’.141
To answer any of these questions we will need to revisit what happened to ‘auth-
ority ’, the ‘self ’, ‘choice’ and the ‘ individual ’ in the long 1960s.142 We will need to
conduct an intensively cross-national comparative study to unpick accounts of Wave
Two. Explanatory factors often proposed, such as the VietnamWar, vary immensely in
meaning and signiﬁcance between cultures. We knowmuch more about the convulsions
on American campuses than we do about the similarly intense episodes in Japan.143 We
will need to consider contrarian arguments (‘ there was no crisis in science in the
1960s’). We will need to reassess the New Right as well as the New Left. We will need
to jettison some received associations, such as entrepreneurship with the political right
and, perhaps, sociology of scientiﬁc knowledge as an inherently politically progressive
project. And we will need to treat many secondary sources as primary sources.
140 C. G. Brown, The Death of Christian Britain: Understanding Secularisation, 1800–2000, London,
2001.
141 Etzioni and Nunn, op. cit. (19).
142 The literature on Western individualism is itself vast in scope. See T. C. Heller et al. (eds.),
Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy, Individuality, and the Self in Western Thought, Stanford, 1986.
R. N. Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life, Berkeley, 1985.
And, lest we forget, F. Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order, London, 1949.
143 B. Burnett, ‘Locating historical understanding of Japanese andWestern resistance in education’, paper
at AARE 2004 conference, Melbourne.
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